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THE ECONOMIC EFFECT OF THE SEVERANCE TAX
ON
DECISIONS OF THE MINING FIRM
ALLYN 0. LOCKNER*
The severance tax on mineral production is largely a development
of the present century.1 The tax is frequently levied in preference to
the conventional property tax, thereby avoiding the problems of
determining the physical amount and taxable valuation of under-
ground ore deposits.2 Many authorities have maintained the property
tax not to be in the interest of conservation, since it encourages the
firm to "mine out" from under the tax.3 Conversely, the severance
0 Economist, Bureau of the Census, United States Department of Commerce, Wash-
ington, D.C.
The author is indebted to Kenneth Anderson of the Bureau of the Census, and to
Frederick Stocker, Harvey Shapiro, and Howard Hill of the Economic Research Service,
United States Department of Agriculture, for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
The author assumes full responsibility for the contents of the article; the analyses
and conclusions are his and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bureau of the
Census or the Department of Commerce.
1. Tax Policy, Feb. 1940, p. 1; H. L. Lutz, Public Finance 653 (D. Appleton-Century
Co., 3d ed. 1936).
2. Many writers have discussed this problem. See, e.g., W. A. Roberts, State Taxa-
tion of Metallic Deposits 15-26 (Harvard Univ. Press 1944), for a discussion of varia-
tions in the discount rate and interest rate under the Hoskold Formula.
To avoid the problems of appraising an underground metalliferous deposit, the
assessed valuation is based on the proceeds realized from working the deposit. This is
the case in seven Rocky Mountain states: Colorado (one-fourth of gross proceeds or all
of net proceeds) ; Idaho, Montana, and Nevada (net proceeds) ; New Mexico (average
net proceeds for five preceding years or annual net proceeds) ; Utah (two times the
average net proceeds for three preceding years) ; and Wyoming (gross value of pro-
duction, less development allowance). From an economic standpoint these taxes resemble
a hybrid severance tax more closely than the conventional property tax.
3. See, e.g., H. M. Groves, Financing Government 305 (Henry Holt & Co., 4th ed.
1954) ; Crockett, Some Policy Questions Relating to the Taxation of Mineral Resources,
1948 Proceedings of the National Tax A. 227; Nat. Resources Bd., Report on National
Planning and Public Works in Relation to Natural Resources and Including Land Use
and Water Resources with Findings and Recommendations, at 427 (1934) ; S. V. Ciriacy-
Wantrup, Resource Conservation & Economics and Policies 177-84 (Univ. of Cal. Press
1952).
For a comparatively recent defense of the application of the conventional property
tax to mineral deposits, see Allen, Ad Valorem versus Severance Taxation of Minerals,
1952 Proceedings of the National Tax A. 574-80.
EFFECT OF THE SEVERANCE TAX
tax has been supported on the ground that it encourages conservation
of mineral resuorces.4
There is much variation among the severance taxes utilized by the
states.' A severance tax may be defined broadly as a levy assessed at
flat or graduated rates by a government on the privilege, process, or
act of commercially severing or extracting natural resources from the
soil or water, and measured by the physical amount or the gross or
net value of the natural resources produced or sold.
The purpose of this article is to analyze, under certain assump-
tions, the short-run economic effect of a state severance tax on deci-
sions by the metal-mining firm operating a recovery plant. The
probable consequences of the tax for the conservation of the mineral
resource are also discussed. The effect of the tax is examined when
flat and graduated rate structures are utilized. Alternative tax bases
are (1) the physical output of raw ore and metal contained in the
product of the recovery plant, and (2) the gross value of metal pro-
duced or sold.
I
THE OUTPUT FRAMEWORK
The mining firm makes two distinct and fundamental types of
decisions in working a hard metalliferous deposit." First, the firm is
faced with alternative rates of extracting the metal per time period
from the deposit under production. The speed of extraction is the
paramount economic factor. This decision is labeled the rate of
recovery. Second, the firm must decide from among alternative total
4. President's Materials Policy Comm'n, Foundations for Growth and Security, in
Resources for Freedom vol. I (1952). The Commission stated that "whenever State and
local governments can substitute severance taxes, or taxes on gross or net proceeds for
ad valorem taxes on mineral reserves, they will make a contribution toward improving
the Nation's minerals position." Id. at 36.
5. CCH State Tax Guide 4501-991 (2d ed. 1959).
The graduated severance tax on net profits has been discussed elsewhere. See Lock-
ner, The Economic Effect of a Progressive Net Profits Tax on Decision-Making by the
Mining Firm, 38 Land Econ. 341 (1962). In at least one state it appears feasible to utilize
such a tax in conjunction with the conventional state income tax, as applied to metal-
mining enterprises. See A Proposed Mineral Tax for Colorado, 15 Nat'l Tax J. 268
(1962).
6. For a discussion of the theory of the mining firm upon which this article is par-
tially based, see Carlisle, The Economics of a Fund Resource with Particular Reference
to Mining, 44 Am. Econ. Rev. 595 (1954). For a more recent discussion of this subject,
see Tessaro, Factors Affecting the Choice of a Rate of Production in Mining, 1960
Canadian Mining & Metallurgical Bull. 575-81.
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amounts of metal to be extracted from the deposit under production
(alternative percentages of the total absolute, although perhaps un-
known, amount of metal present in the deposit). The role of space,
especially the vertical dimension affecting the accessibility of the
mineral, and the grade and quality7 of the ore, are the strategic
economic factors. This decision is designated the level of recovery.
The mineral deposit is a fund resource not replaceable by the re-
newable energy of solar activity. Therefore, the time required to ex-
haust the deposit can be shortened by increasing the rate of recovery
or decreasing the level of recovery, or both. Conversely, the future
date of exhaustion can be postponed by decreasing the rate of recov-
ery or increasing the level of recovery, or both.
As far as mineral production is concerned, conservation of a metal-
lic mineral resource involves the duration of production from the
mineral deposit. More conservation occurs when the mining firm's
rate of recovery is decreased or its level of recovery is increased, or
both. These adjustments involve a reduction in the speed of mining,
the extraction of more inaccessible ore and/or a decline in the critical
grade and quality of supramarginal ore, thereby redistributing
production over a longer future time period. Other things being
equal, either or both of the adjustments in the rate and level of
recovery conserve the resource by lengthening the economic life of
the mineral deposit and postponing the date of entry into new and
undeveloped deposits.
II
THE COST FRAMEWORK
The mining firm's production decisions are determined by discount-
ing the alternative future profit streams within the price and cost
structures.
In this analysis, the pre-tax costs of production include all the costs
of discovering, purchasing, or otherwise acquiring the right to mine;
developing and equipping the mine; extracting the valuable product;
and marketing. The severance tax is added to these costs in arriving
at the post-tax costs of production. No allowance is made for imputed
rent and wages or the normal return on capital. An unusually large
7. In the analysis of metalliferous ore, the term "grade" refers to the per cent of
metal content or the metal content per ton of rock or raw ore. The term "quality" refers
to such characteristics as mineral composition, presence of deleterious impurities, grain
size, grain boundary relations, hardness and larger textural features. All of these fac-
tors affect the costs of treating the ore and recovering the valuable product.
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portion of the costs in mining represents capital investment and is
not affected by either the rate or level of recovery in the short run.
Other costs, such as those of pumping, minimum amount of manage-
ment, obsolescence, and interest are "fixed charges" in the usual sense
because they must be met at a more or less fixed rate per day if the
mine is to operate. The total of such expenses is a direct function of
the time required to exhaust the ore body. Still other costs may at
times increase and at other times decrease on a per-ton basis as either
the rate or level of recovery is increased. In grouping these ex-
penses into fixed and variable costs, it is necessary to refer to costs
at a total for the expected life of the deposit (i.e., unit cost times
the total unit output to be obtained from the deposit) rather than
total cost per time period (i.e., unit cost times the output per time
period), as is ordinarily done. The justification for this approach is
that both the rate and level of recovery can be changed independently
over a wide range. The term fixed cost (FC), therefore, refers to
costs which remain constant as a total for the life of the mine, regard-
less of wide variations in either the rate or level of recovery. These
costs include mainly the investment of capital in acquiring the prop-
erty, developing and equipping the mine, and investment in the con-
centrating or recovery plant. Average fixed cost per unit of output is
decreased by increasing the level of recovery but not by increasing the
rate of recovery. All other costs are variable. Costs which vary as a
total for the life of the mine with respect to both the rate and level
of recovery are termed rate-level-variable costs (VCRL). Among
these expenses are most direct labor and material costs and the fixed
charges discussed above. In general, a rate-level-variable cost will
vary by different amounts and perhaps in opposite directions (e.g.,
pumping) with a given proportionate change in the rate and level of
recovery. Of the two remaining cost categories, level-variable costs
(VCL) vary as a total for the life of the mine with changes in the
level of recovery but remain fixed with variations in the rate of recov-
ery. These costs include, for example, royalties on the gross product,
and costs of underground surveying, sampling, and geology. Rate-
variable costs (VCR) vary as a total with changes in the rate of recov-
ery only. These costs include, for example, the addition of more
workers per shift or the addition of another shift of workers. The
cost classification of the severance tax is discussed later in the analysis.
Neither costs to be incurred nor gross revenues to be realized over
the economic life of the deposit are discounted to present value in
this analysis. Instead, the resulting alternative profit streams, both
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pre-tax and post-tax, are compared in the light of the presumed time
preference of the recipient mining firm. Unless otherwise stated, the
mine product price, factor costs and level of technology are assumed
to remain constant, not only currently, but also for the life of the
mine.
III
THE EFFECT OF THE SEVERANCE TAX ON THE RATE
OF RECOVERY UNDER A GUARANTEED PRICE
J. The Theoretical Setting
Assuming that the level of recovery is given, the effect of a state
severance tax on the rate of recovery of a mining firm in a multi-state
metal-mining industry can be analyzed with the assistance of a dia-
gram. In Figure 1, the solid lines depict the pre-tax situation, and the
FIGURE 1
EFFECT OF SEVERANCE TAX ON THE RATE OF RECOVERY
UNDER A GUARANTEED PRICE
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broken lines show the post-tax situation. The tax is levied at a flat
rate and is based on the physical output or the gross value of metal
produced or sold.'
The sale of the metal is guaranteed at "P" price per ton; i.e., the
firm's sales curve is infinitely elastic. This condition occurs when the
firm is operating under perfect competition. Also, the guaranteed
price exists when the firm is operating under a long-term sales con-
tract stipulating the price of the metal.
By assuming the level of recovery to be given, the total product is
fixed, and fixed costs and level-variable costs are constant as a total
for the life of the deposit. Accordingly, average fixed costs (AFC)
and average level-variable costs (AVCL) are fixed amounts per ton.
The structure of average total unit cost (ATUC) is U-shaped, re-
flecting the economies and diseconomies of alternative rates of re-
covery. The marginal cost (MC) represents the additions to total
cost as the rate of recovery is increased.
The maximization of total profit on the stock of ore, disregarding
its distribution in time, is obtained by mining at "A" rate of recovery
where average cost is at a minimum. At this rate of recovery, the
average profit per unit of product recovered during the period (year)
is also maximized. Operation at this rate of recovery might be ex-
pected to occur where the deposit is very small or perhaps where the
volume of sales precludes continuous operation at a higher rate of
recovery. The highest current rate of profit per time period (year) is
obtained at "B" rate of recovery where marginal cost (MCR) equals
marginal revenue (MR). This rate of recovery is favored when
rapid return of capital is desired or required, but the total profits
(realizable over the life of the deposit) will have suffered by the
change to a rate of recovery higher than the least average cost rate.
Profits are assumed to be discounted at a rate of interest commen-
surate with the time preference of the recipient mining firm. The
equilibrium rate of recovery is that rate of recovery which yields the
maximum present value of future profit streams. Ordinarily, this
rate of recovery occurs between "A" rate of recovery at which total
profit is maximized, and "B" rate of recovery at which the current
8. The physical output or gross value of metal "produced" or "sold" may actually
diverge in practice, especially where stockpiling occurs. In this discussion, the mineral
"produced" and the mineral "sold" are assumed to be synonomous.
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rate of profit per time period is maximized. In Figure 1, the pre-tax
equilibrium is shown to be at "C" rate of recovery, with "X" repre-
senting the attendant present value of future pre-tax total profits.
B. A Flat-Rate Tax on the Output or Value of Metal
The flat-rate severance tax is a cost of production and applies to
physical output or the gross value of metal produced or sold. The tax
constitutes a fixed unit cost and a fixed percentage of the given price.
The total tax on the deposit will vary as a total for the life of the
mine with changes in the level of recovery. Since the level of recovery
is given, the tax is shown in Figure 1 as a fixed average level-variable
cost (AVCL). Also, the tax is shown as a fixed addition to average
total unit cost (ATUC) and rate-variable marginal cost (M CR).
The tax has essentially the same general effect on the firm's equili-
brium rate of recovery, no matter which base is utilized. The tax does
not affect the "A" rate of recovery at which total profit is maximized
(minimum ATUC), since the amount of the tax per unit is the same
for all rates of recovery. However, the tax does reduce the "B" rate
of recovery at which the current rate of profit is maximized (MCR-
MR). As the rate of recovery moves toward the point at which the
current rate of profit is maximized, there are not only increases in the
rate of output and in gross revenue, but also an increase in marginal
cost. The tax shifts upward the entire schedule of rate-variable
marginal cost, thereby causing it to equal marginal revenue (MR) at
"D" rate of recovery. Thus, the point of maximum current rate of
profit retreats to a lower rate of recovery.
The equilibrium is shifted to a lower rate of recovery. The tax
causes the diseconomies of speed in profitable mining to be encoun-
tered at a lower rate of recovery. Assuming the firm maintains a
constant rate of discount before and after the tax, it will be encour-
aged to reduce the equilibrium rate of recovery in an attempt to ap-
proach the maximum present value of future profit streams achieved
9. The equilibrium rate of recovery can be lower than the "A" rate of recovery
only if the time discount is negative as might be the case, for example, if ore reserves are
held in the expectation of a substantial rise in price in the future or as a hedge against
unfavorable developments elsewhere. Such equilibrium will be higher for higher assumed
levels of recovery. With a very high rate of discount, as when market risks are high,
the equilibirum rate of recovery will move toward "B" where the maximum current rate
of profit is achieved and where marginal cost equals marginal revenue (MCR=MR).
The rate of recovery cannot exceed this amount without shortening the economic life of
the mine and reducing the current rate of profit. See Carlisle, oP. cit. supra note 6, at
601 n.7.
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at the pre-tax equilibrium rate of recovery. 10 This adjustment results
in the maximization of the present value of future post-tax profit
streams over the life of the ore deposit. In Figure 1, the tax is shown
to reduce the equilibrium to "E" rate of recovery located between
"A", the point of maximum total post-tax profit and "D", the point
of maximum current rate of post-tax profit. "Y" represents the at-
tendant present value of future post-tax total profits.
The magnitude of the shift in the equilibrium rate of recovery
depends primarily on the firm's cost condition, the output or gross
value of metal produced or sold, and the height of the tax rate. A
reduction in the firm's rate of discount would accentuate the shift in
the equilibrium rate of recovery; conversely, a rise in the discount
rate would modify the shift.
In a multi-state metal-mining industry, it has been assumed that the
decline in the firm's equilibrium rate of recovery has no effect on in-
dustry price and, consequently, on the firm's sales curve. A rise in
industry price would probably occur where the taxing state produces a
significant percentage of the industry output. Under this condition,
there will be an upward shift in the firm's sales curve in the short run,
thereby modifying the reduction in the equilibrium rate of recovery.
A renegotiation of the firm's sales contract resulting in a price in-
crease in the short run would have the same general effect.
C. A Graduated Versus a Flat-Rate Tax on the Output or
Value of Metal
If the severance tax on the output or gross value of metal produced
or sold contained a graduated rate schedule so as to be effectively
progressive," the amount of unit tax would increase as the rate of
recovery increases. Graduated tax rates apply to the tax base arising
during a given period, usually one year. As the annual tax base in-
creases, the effective tax rate increases, causing a rise in the unit tax.
10. If the firm desires to maintain the pre-tax equilibrium rate of discount of future
profits after the tax is levied, it must decrease its equilibrium rate of recovery. Although
the point of the firm's zero rate of discount (also point of maximum total profit) remains
unchanged, the point of the firm's highest rate of discount of future profits has shifted
to a lower rate of recovery.
11. The graduated rate schedule of a tax does not typically indicate its true or effec-
tive progression. Bracket or marginal graduation produces an effective progression
substantially below that indicated by the sequence of bracket rates. Only fractions or seg-
ments of the tax base are subject to the higher bracket rates. The reduction in the pro-
gressivity of the tax can be overcome by adopting lump-sum or totality graduation,
whereby each successively higher rate is applicable to the firm's entire tax base.
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As compared with a flat-rate tax, it can be visualized in Figure 1
that a graduated tax causes a decrease in the "A" rate of recovery at
which total profit is maximized and a more pronounced decline in the
"B" rate of recovery at which the current rate of profit is maximized.
There is more reason to believe that such a tax, as compared to flat-
rate tax, causes a decline or a more pronounced decline in the equili-
brium rate of recovery than is shown by the adjustment from "C" to
"E" in Figure 1. Whether or not such an adjustment will in fact oc-
cur and, if so, the magnitude of the adjustment are determined
largely by the height, continuity and steepness of the rate schedule
and the size of the firm's annual tax base.
D. J Tax on Output Versus a Tax on Value
The effect of the severance tax based on physical units varies with
changing unit prices for the metal. For example, a given tax per ton
of metal output probably causes a sharper relative decline in the rate
of recovery when the metal is selling at a low price rather than at a
high price. Such a tax may curtail the rate of recovery more when it is
already limited and the price is falling, and less when the rate of
recovery is expanding and the price is rising. Conversely, a tax on the
value of mineral produced or sold absorbs approximately the same
percentage of the changing price. The tax per unit increases as price
increases, and decreases as price declines. The restrictive effects on
the rate of recovery do not increase with falling prices and decrease
with rising prices, as is the case of a physical-unit tax.
IV
THE EFFECT OF THE SEVERANCE TAX ON THE LEVEL
OF RECOVERY UNDER A GUARANTEED PRICE
A. The TheoreticalSetting
Assuming the rate of recovery is given, the effect of a state sever-
ance tax on the level of recovery of a mining firm in a multi-state
metal-mining industry can be analyzed with the assistance of a dia-
gram. In Figure 2 the solid and broken lines present the pre-tax and
post-tax situations, respectively.
Assume an irregular ore body containing a given amount of metal
is selling at "P" price per ton. The ore boundaries are gradational
and a variety of grades of supramarginal and submarginal ore occur
roughly in a zonal arrangement. There are numerous choices between
[VOL. 4
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FIGURE 2
EFFECT OF SEVERANCE TAX ON THE LEVEL OF RECOVERY
UNDER A GUARANTEED PRICE
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mining the readily accessible, high-grade and high-quality ore and
nonselectively mining the entire deposit. Extraction of seventy-five
to ninety per cent of the metal in the ore is assumed to be feasible.
It is estimated that regardless of the total tonnage recovered a given
total fixed cost is necessary for equipment and primary development.
The average total unit cost first declines, then rises (U-shaped) as
the level of recovery is increased, not only because of the economies
of scale, but also because of higher costs incurred in extracting and
processing more inaccessible, lower-grade, lower-quality ore. Since
the rate of recovery is given, average fixed costs and average rate-
variable costs decline as the level of recovery increases. Marginal
cost (MCL) represents additions to total cost as the level of recovery
is increased.
Profits per unit of product are greatest at "A" level of recovery
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where average total unit costs are at a minimum. Since the rate of
recovery is assumed to be constant, this is also the level of recovery
at which the current rate of profit per time period (year) is maxi-
mized. Total profits are greatest at "B" level of recovery where mar-
ginal cost (MCL) equals marginal revenue (MR). The latter point
is the optimum if time distribution of net profits can be ignored, i.e.,
if the rate of discount is zero, or if the difference in time required to
mine alternative amounts of mineral is not great.
Assuming a discounting of profits, the equilibrium level of recovery
is that level of recovery which yields the maximum present value of
future profit streams. This level of recovery must lie between the
"A" and "B" levels of recovery. 12 In Figure 2, the pre-tax equili-
brium is shown to be at "C" level of recovery, with "X" represent-
ing the accompanying present value of future pre-tax total profits.
B. A Flat-Rate Tax on the Output or Value of Metal
The flat-rate severance tax is a cost of production and applies to
physical output or the gross value of metal produced or sold. The tax
constitutes a fixed amount per unit of output and a fixed percentage
of the given price. Under such circumstances, the tax is shown in
Figure 2 as a fixed addition to average total unit cost (ATUC) and
level-variable marginal cost (MCL).
The tax has essentially the same general effect on the firm's equi-
librium level of recovery, no matter which base is utilized. The tax
does not affect the "A" level of recovery at which the current rate of
profit is maximized (minimum ATUC), since the amount of the tax
per unit of metal mined is the same for all levels of recovery. How-
ever, the tax reduces the "B" level of recovery at which the total
profit is maximized (MCL=MR). As the level of recovery moves
toward the point at which the total profit is maximized, there are
increases in metal output and gross revenue from the deposit and in
marginal cost. The tax shifts upward the entire schedule of level-
variable marginal cost, thereby causing it to equal marginal revenue
12. The equilibrium will approach the "A" level of recovery with a very high dis-
count rate, but cannot be less than this level of recovery, since both the life of the mine
and the current rate of profit decline below this level. The equilibrium level of recovery
can be greater than the "B" level of recovery only if the discount rate is negative, since
above this level the mining firm would be sacrificing total profits for a longer life. For a
particular discount rate, the equilibrium lies closer to the "B" level of recovery when
the assumed rate of recovery is higher, because the extra time required to mine at a
higher level and the consequent loss through time discount are less at higher rates of
recovery than at lower rates.
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(MR) at "D" level of recovery. Thus, the point of maximum total
profit retreats to a lower level of recovery.
The equilibrium is shifted to a lower level of recovery. By raising
the critical grade and quality of ore and encouraging the possible
abandonment of the more inaccessible ore, mineral that was immedi-
ately above the margin before the tax becomes submarginal after the
tax. The point of maximum total profit on the stock of ore (where the
discount rate is zero) has shifted to a lower level of recovery. Assum-
ing a constant rate of discount, the equilibrium level of recovery
shifts to a lower level in an attempt to approach the maximum present
value of future profit streams achieved at the pre-tax equilibrium
level of recovery."3 This adjustment results in the maximization of
the present value of future post-tax profit streams over the life of the
deposit. In Figure 2, the tax is shown to reduce the equilibrium to
"E" level of recovery located between "A," the point of maximum
current rate of post-tax profit, and "D," the point of maximum total
post-tax profit. "Y" represents the accompanying present value of
future post-tax total profits.
The magnitude of the shift in the equilibrium level of recovery de-
pends primarily on the firm's cost condition, the output or gross value
of metal produced or sold, and the height of the tax rate. An increase
in the firm's rate of discount could accentuate the shift in the equilib-
rium level of recovery; conversely, a decrease in the discount rate
would modify the shift.
As mentioned earlier, it has been assumed that the tax had no effect
on industry price, and consequently, on the firm's sales curve. A rise
in industry price would probably occur where the taxing state pro-
duces a significant percentage of the industry output. Under this con-
dition, insofar as the tax causes a significant decline in the industry's
rate of recovery and a rise in industry price, there will be an upward
shift in the firm's sales curve in the short run. This development
would modify the reduction in the firm's equilibrium level of recov-
ery. Also, a renegotiation of the firm's sales contract resulting in a
price increase in the short run would have the same general effect.
13. If the firm desires to maintain the pre-tax equilibrium rate of discount of future
profits after the tax is levied it must decrease its equilibrium level of recovery. Although
the level of recovery associated with the highest rate of discount (also the point of max-
imum current rate of profit and minimum average total cost) remains unchanged, the
level of recovery at which the discount rate is zero, i.e., where MCL = MR (also the
point of maximum total profit), has shifted to a lower level of recovery.
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C. A Tax on Metal Output Versus a Tax on Ore Output
The discussion of the effect on the level of recovery has been in
terms of a severance tax based on the output or gross value of metal
produced or sold. A severance tax is commonly levied on the physical
quantity of raw ore or rock extracted or sold. Such a tax makes little
or no allowance for variations in the accessibility, quality or grade
of the ore, or perhaps for variations in distance from the market.
These and other factors determine how close the ore is to the eco-
nomic margin. Units of near-marginal ore are worth less than units
far above the margin, because it takes more tons of near-marginal
raw ore to provide a given amount of metal. By definition, near-
marginal ore is more costly to extract and process than ore far above
the margin. The marginality of the ore increases as the level of
recovery increases. Under these circumstances the "raw ore" tax per
unit of metal output increases as the marginality of the ore increases
-that is, as there is a rise in the level of recovery. The firm must
extract more taxable raw ore to produce a given amount of metal.
As compared with a tax on metal output, it can be visualized in
Figure 2 that a tax on raw ore causes a decline in the "A" level of
recovery at which the current rate of profit is maximized and a more
pronounced decline in the "B" level of recovery at which total profit
is maximized. There is more reason to believe that a tax on ore out-
put, as compared with a tax on metal output, causes a decline or a
more pronounced decline in the equilibrium level of recovery than
is shown by the adjustment from "C" to "E" in Figure 2. As a result,
production from the near-marginal deposit or near-marginal por-
tions of the deposit would more likely be restricted. Whether or not
such an adjustment will in fact occur and, if so, the magnitude of the
adjustment are determined largely by the rate of decline in the acces-
sibility, grade and quality of the raw ore as the level of recovery
increases.
D. A Tax on Output Versus a Tax on Value
The effect of the physical-unit tax on the level of recovery also
varies with changing unit prices for the metal. For example, a given
tax per ton of metal output probably causes a sharper decline in level
of recovery when the metal is selling at a low price rather than at a
high price. Such a tax may curtail the level of recovery more when it
is already limited, and less when it is expanding and the price is rising.
Conversely, a tax on production or sales value absorbs approximately
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the same percentage of the price. The amount of tax per unit in-
creases as the price increases, and decreases as the price declines. The
restrictive effects on the level of recovery do not increase with falling
prices and decrease with rising prices, as appears to be the case with a
physical-unit tax.
V
THE EFFECT OF THE SEVERANCE TAX ON A
MONOPOLISTIC MINING FIRM
A. The Theoretical Setting
The assumptions of a guaranteed market price and a multi-state
metal-mining industry are now removed. Some mineral deposits are
located within the boundaries of one state and are worked by firms
that possess monopolistic or oligopolistic characteristics.
Under general price theory, the monopolist sets industry price, in-
curs all industry costs, receives all industry profits and, therefore, is
in a position to influence future profits by varying present prices, pro-
duction and costs. 14 Accordingly, he will presumably be influenced by
the intertemporal relationships in determining his cost, production,
and pricing policies from period to period. Given such intertemporal
relationships, the monopolist will presumably determine these pol-
icies over a succession of time periods so as to maximize the aggre-
gate of the present value of separate period profits through time (i.e.,
discounting the separate period profits by the appropriate rate of in-
terest). This implies that the monopolist will not necessarily set
price so as to maximize each successive short-period profit. Instead,
he should be willing to set price at another level in any present
period if it is expected to result in an addition to future-period profits
which is greater than the resulting subtraction from present-period
profits. Similarly, he may incur present costs which will increase prof-
its in a future period. Therefore, the monopolist attempts to max-
imize profits over a series of time periods or through time rather
than during one period or at a point in time.
The foregoing discussion would seem to indicate that monopoly
14. For a general discussion of monopoly decision-making upon which this para-
graph is partly based, see J. S. Bain, Price Theory 233-35 (Henry Holt & Co., rev. ed.
1952). See also Carlisle, op. cit. supra note 6, at 612-14.
Oligopolists, if fully informed and if taking account of the indirect as well as the
direct consequences of their pricing and production policies, will behave like monopo-
lists. See E. H. Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition 46-51 (Harvard
Univ. Press, 6th ed. 1948). To the extent this situation exists, the following discussion
applies to oligopolists operating in the state levying the tax.
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production and pricing behavior is particularly consistent with a firm
having strong monopoly control over the production of a particular
metal. Four possible reasons may be noted for this behavior of the
mining monopolist. First, with price relatively stable over a series of
time periods, one element of market risk is eliminated and operations
can be planned with more certainty. Second, over long periods, by
holding price below the current profit-maximizing level, the demand
in future periods may be stimulated (shifting the demand curves of
these periods to the right) sufficiently to increase aggregate profit
from the ore deposit through time. Third, with fluctuating sales, a
reduction of price in time of depressed sales may conceivably result
in reduced sales at high prices (or increased elasticity of demand at
high prices) in succeeding periods of prosperity. Fourth, the prin-
cipal asset of the mining monopolist is the exhaustible mineral deposit
which has a given, although perhaps presently unknown amount of
supramarginal ore. Here the firm would tend to price in such a way
so as to maximize the present value of future profit streams over the
life of the ore deposit. Although the monopolistic mining firm prob-
ably makes infrequent price and output adjustments to reflect more
frequent changes in costs and sales, from the foregoing discussion it
is concluded that the maximization of the present value of future
profit streams is the principal pricing and production goal.
B. A Flat-Rate Tax on Metal Output
When in equilibrium, the monopolist is conducting operations at
or very near that rate and level of recovery which result in the max-
imum present value of future profit streams from the mineral deposit.
If a flat-rate severance tax, based on physical output, is levied on a
monopolist operating at or very near equilibrium, there will probably
be a shift in production and price in order to achieve or approach a
post-tax equilibrium rate and level of recovery. The adjustments will
tend to be to a lower rate of recovery and to a lower level of recov-
ery,1" 5 and to a higher price. Under such an adjustment the propor-
15. There is a very slight slope to the monopolist's sales curve when the level of
recovery is the independent variable. A change in the level of recovery will affect price
only insofar as there is also a change in the rate at which the mineral is supplied to the
market (rate of recovery). Since the rate of recovery is assumed to be given when
examining the effects of the tax on the level of recovery, there is very little, if any, slope
to the sales curve when the level of recovery is the independent variable. Accordingly,
the effect of the tax on the level of recovery under the assumption of a guaranteed price
would appear to apply generally under conditions of monopoly where costs are increas-
ing. However, the presence of abnormal profits would make the adjustment in the equilib-
rium level of recovery uncertain. See Carlisle, op. cit. supra note 6, at 613 fig. 4.
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tionate reduction in the annual tax and in the tax over the life of the
ore deposit will probably be greater than the proportionate reduction
in the annual profit and in profits over the life of the deposit, respec-
tively. Assuming a constant rate of discount before and after the tax,
such adjustments will maximize the present value of future post-tax
profit streams from the ore deposit.
In addition to the aforementioned characteristics of the tax, the
size of the adjustment in the equilibrium rate of recovery and price,
because of the tax, is determined by two additional factors frequently
associated with the monopoly case. First, given the slopes of the
firm's sales and marginal revenue curves, the adjustment depends in
part upon the cost condition of the mining firm. The largest rise in
price and decline in the rate of recovery occurs with decreasing costs,
the next largest rise in price and decline in the rate of recovery takes
place under constant costs, and the smallest rise in price and decline
in the rate of recovery occurs with increasing costs. Second, the ad-
justment is determined by the relative inelasticity of the firm's sales
curve, caused by the absence of close substitutes for the monopolist's
product. In the probable typical case of a positively-sloped marginal
cost curve, an inelastic sales curve is favorable to a large rise in price
and a small reduction in the rate of recovery.
If the tax rests largely on abnormal profits of the monopolist and
a stable price is expected to maintain or stimulate demand for the
mineral, there may not be any adjustment to the tax. If an adjust-
ment does occur, it will take place after a considerable lapse of time.
C. The Flat-Rate Tax on the Value of Metal
The effect of a tax based on gross value of metal produced or sold
is more uncertain. Since the monopolist's sales curve is downward-
sloping, the tax per unit of output, when the rate of recovery is the
independent variable, decreases as the rate of recovery increases.
This arrangement, while causing a decline in the rate of recovery at
which the current rate of profit is maximized, would tend to cause
the point of maximum total profit to shift to a higher rate of recov-
ery. However, the magnitude of such a shift would be determined
chiefly by the slope of the sales curve and the trend (increasing,
constant, or decreasing) in operating costs as the rate of recovery
is increased. The presence of abnormal profits, as mentioned above,
may result in no adjustment in the equilibrium rate of recovery. If
such an adjustment does occur, it will happen after a considerable
lapse of time. These factors, in turn, would be important in deter-
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mining if the tax affects the equilibrium rate of recovery and price,
and, if so, the direction of the effect.
D. Graduated Tax on Output and Value of Metal
If the severance tax on metal output contained a graduated rate
schedule, the amount of unit tax would increase as the rate of recov-
ery per year increases. The same effect, although more uncertain,
would be true of a graduated tax on the value of metal produced or
sold over the elastic portion of the monopolist's sales curve. This tax
arrangement would not only tend to cause a decline in the rate of
recovery at which the current rate of profit is maximized, but would
also tend to cause the point of maximum total profit to shift to a
lower rate of recovery. The magnitude of these shifts would be
determined by the characteristics of the tax and the cost, sales
elasticity, and abnormal profit conditions. These factors also would
determine whether or not the tax causes a reduction in the equilib-
rium rate of recovery and a rise in price.
CONCLUSION
One of the arguments advanced in favor of the severance tax is
that it promotes conservation of mineral resources. 6 Given certain
definitions and assumptions, an analysis has been made of the eco-
nomic effect of the severance tax on decisions of the mining firm ex-
tracting a metalliferous mineral, and the implications of the tax for
the conservation of this mineral.
16. See, e.g., Vaughan, The Severance Tax, 7 National Tax A. Bull. 243, 247-50
(1922) ; Crockett, Some Policy Questions Relating to the Taxation of Mineral Resources,
1948 Proceedings of the National Tax A. 227; Hotelling, The Economics of Exhaustible
Resources, 39 J. Pol. Econ. 137, 165 (1931) ; Ohio Dep't of Taxation Div. of Research,
Report 35-56 on Severance Taxation, at 3 (1956) ; Fed'n of Tax Adm'rs, Research Re-
port No. 30 on State Taxes on Natural Resources, at 14 (1951).
Conversely, a few authorities have been cognizant of the adverse implications of
certain types of severance taxes on mining decisions. See, e.g., Parsons, Taxation of
Mining Enterprises-Federal, State and Local, Hearings on Stockpile and Accessibility
of Strategic and Critical Materials to the United States in Time of War Before the
Special Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials and Fuel Economics of the Senate Com-
mittee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 7, at 237 (1954) ;
R. Barlowe, Land Resource Economics 547 n.17 (Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1958) ; Commission
Appointed to Study the Taxation of Natural Resources to the Governor and General
Assembly of Virginia, Report on Taxation of Natural Resources in Virginia, at 67
(1951). For one of the few public finance textbooks that discusses this matter, see M. S.
Kendrick, Public Finance 278 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1951).
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The tax tends to reduce the speed of extraction and to decrease
the total amount of metal to be extracted from the deposit. The first
adjustment promotes conservation, but the second adjustment is re-
pugnant to conservation. The occurrence and size of these adjust-
ments depend primarily on the characteristics of the tax and the
economic circumstances surrounding the production situation.
The conservation argument on behalf of severance taxation ap-
parently results from considering a special case and giving primary,
if not sole, consideration to the effect of the tax on the speed of ex-
tracting the metal.
